


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ADMIRAL TURNER'S REMARKS
TO
SUMMER ONLY EMPLOYEES

AUDITORIUM
THURSDAY, 20 July 78

Good morning. I'm pleased to have you here, pleased to be with you, pleased you are spending the summer with us and I know making a contribution to our activities here. I hope that in the process of it that you are getting a good feel for what you all know a lot about already because your parents, or one of them at least, are involved with us. We are pleased to have this extension of our family spirit in the Agency here by having you with us all summer. I'm going to spend, I hope, very little time in talking and mainly answering your questions because I'd like to address what's on your minds after your many years of association with the Agency indirectly and now your direct association for these weeks.

I would like to emphasize that there are two basic functions that we do out here. You're working in many different areas of the Agency, some of you see the overall picture, some of you see only the picture in your particular segment. The two things you do in intelligence is collect data and then you interpret it. You collect data by three different means as a nation. There's human intelligence (the spies and agents). It is collected by signals intelligence, getting the waves that go through the air, picking them off and desiphering and understanding them. And by photographic intelligence. Those are the three basic methods. Now

here, the DDS&T is involved in the two technical forms of intelligence collection, signals intelligence and photo intelligence. The DDO is the Agency's and the nation's primary human intelligence activity. The NFAC on the other side is the other half of the picture--all of the interpretations, the analysis, the use of the data collected. As you know, of course, I'm only talking here about these three Agency components.

Outside, in the Department of Defense and elsewhere, the Department of State, we have other collection activities. The National Security Agency is the basic signals collection agency of the government is housed in the Department of Defense. It ties in closely with our smaller signals intelligence activity, the DDS&T. The Department of Defense runs most of the photographic intelligence that ties in very closely with some very substantial role the DDS&T plays there. The Department of Defense has human intelligence activity also which is subordinate in supporting that of the DDO here. So, over in Defense and State there are corresponding organizations to NFAC. It is very critical that we have those because we want to have competing analysis, competing interpretations.

The real marvelous challenge of being in intelligence is how to bring together all these pieces of data that are collected by these different systems, organizations, and piece them into a picture that makes some sense that can be interpreted by the decision makers and be useful. But that is not easy and it's never expressly clear. When people talk about hard intelligence and

soft intelligence, let me assure you that there's almost no intelligence that is absolutely hard, absolutely conclusive. Yet maybe you know they have a missile in that hole in that place and that's a very firm, hard piece of intelligence. But why they've got it there and what it will do and why they put it there and how important it is is all very interpretative. And it is useful to us to have the Defense Department studying why that missile is in that hole; the State Department studying what the purpose behind the whole missile program; and our people in NFAC doing it also because there's a great danger that anyone, no matter how smart he is, can get focused on three pieces of the puzzle, three clues that came in from the collectors and forget a portion, or discard an important one as not being important when in fact history may prove that that was really the important return. So we want competing analysis.

On the collection side, I am sure you can appreciate that signals interpretation systems, the intercept systems, photographic systems, human systems are expensive. The first two, the technical ones are really expensive. The human systems are risky, you get into trouble if you make a mistake. So you want that part of intelligence, the collection part, well coordinated, well brought together. Number one, it's expensive or risky and therefore, you don't want to do more with it than you absolutely need to. Secondly, because it's expensive, you don't want to have too much, you don't want to overlap. Thirdly, because it's

critical to the future and safety of our country that we get good and right amount and kind of information, we want to make sure that they are working as a team so that they fill each other's gaps. You see what I mean, you don't want these people to be doing this, these this, these this, and nobody doing something else that's got to be done or something that falls in between them. We need to be sure that what you can't get from a photograph, you try to get from a signal or a human agent. What doesn't a photograph tell you? It doesn't tell you why they did what you've just taken a picture of. Right? It's very hard to be sure you know why they moved this thing from here to there; or why they built this thing this way instead of that way. But when you've got the picture and you know something about it, you go to a human agent and you say, now look we know they're building a thing over here and it looks to me like it's a nuclear weapons production plant, but I'm not sure whether that's it, you get into the ministry of nuclear affairs in that country and see what you can find for me. Then you turn the signals fellows loose and you say, hey look we found this thing in a photograph over here but it's got an antenna on the roof, they must be sending out some kind of a signal, tell us what that is. Then you bring it altogether. This is what I'm charged with doing, bringing this together in my second capacity, not only as head of the Central Intelligence Agency, but as Director of Central Intelligence.

My second job is to coordinate all the activities of the entire Intelligence Community. And that primarily means in this collection side, to ensure that we don't do too much, we don't do too little, and whatever we do is in a teamwork, coordinated fashion. As Director of Central Intelligence it is also my job to see that these competing interpretative analytic organizations, Defense, State, and CIA primarily, are at least asking the right questions, and producing evaluations on the right materials that are given to our decision makers. I'm going downtown this afternoon for instance, and be chairman of a committee with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Brzezinski, Secretary of the Treasury, Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and a couple of others. The whole purpose of the meeting is to look at them and say, Gentlemen, what do you want, what do you need as the consumers of intelligence which I should be producing for you. Am I fulfilling the role of intelligence because we are only here to support you people. You are the policy makers. That's an important distinction that you should all be aware of while you are here. That is, that in intelligence we stay as far away from policy as we can.

People sometimes come to me in public question periods and say, what do you think, should we have a new SALT agreement. I say, that's not my business. It's my business to ensure that the people negotiating the SALT are aware of what the strengths of

the Soviet Union are; are ware of if we make an agreement that you won't have any more of these kinds of widgets. But I can tell them that if the other side built those widgets, that I can check that, or that there is a ten percent chance or seventy percent chance or a ninety-nine percent chance that if they cheat and build those widgets, that we in intelligence will be able to tell you, the policy makers. But you see if we in intelligence say, I think that SALT Treaty would be terrible, but this one would be good, then the people begin to wonder whether, when we provide them intelligence about whether we can verify this SALT Treaty or that one, that we are biased; that we are interpreting the intelligence to suit our policy desires. So, in spite of what you often read in the newspapers--the CIA was in favor of this or against that or put out a position paper on such and such--we try very scrupulously to stay out of the policy business and to providing the most unbiased, most objective information we can to help the policy makers to make those decisions.

The greatest strength we have is our people and I would like to say to you what you already know because of your long association with Central Intelligence Agency, that we have as fine a group of public servants in this organization as there is anywhere in our government, and they'll stand up to any group of people in any industry or business anywhere in the world. They are capable, dedicated and very patriotic. That is why we are pleased to have you with us at this early stage. We hope it will give you that appreciation and that has several benefits

to us. One is as you go along with your education and your life, you are going to become part of the important opinion shapers in our country. And although you already understand the Agency and its business fairly well, we want you to have a better understanding of us because there is a great need in our country today for people to understand and appreciate the value of what we do, that this is critical to our country. Beyond that, we're selfish because we hope that this additional insight into the importance, the challenge, the great contribution of our Agency will lead a lot of you to come back after you finish high school, finish college, whatever you decide to do and come work with us on a regular basis. Let me answer your questions if I can. Who would like to lead off?

QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
SUMMER ONLY EMPLOYEES

Q: (Inaudible)

A: Do I ever have any problems with my conscience on things I do and authorize? No, I wrestle with my conscience in many decisions. I simply will not do something that I don't think is proper, certainly not anything that I think is illegal. I don't want to go to jail anymore than anybody else. That is the problem because we all are honest, and we're not trying to break the law. Problems come with tough decisions--and is the value to the country of obtaining this information worth the risk. This Agency has been criticized over the years, particularly in the last few, for having done things that weren't worth the risk. Let me tell you that I sincerely believe there have been few if any people here who make decisions and take risks that were criticized afterwards who didn't do it after searching their conscience and doing it in what they thought was in the best interests of their country. You have to always remember that what was acceptable ten years ago is often criticized today. My recollection, when the Bay of Pigs came along, there wasn't any outcry in this country that that was an immoral and improper thing to do, we were all unhappy that we botched it--not because we did it. Today, we are unhappy because we did it. Now maybe our hindsight is better and so on. But I'm saying that people here who decided on some of that were in conformance with the attitudes of the country. We're trying today to stay in more conformance with the attitudes of the country but we can't predict what they are going to say about us ten years from now. But I sleep easily at night because I do wrestle with my conscience when I have to make a decision and when I make it, I feel that I've made it on the best grounds that I can. As a human being, I'll make mistakes but I know I'm doing it with sincerity, I know I'm doing it with the best I have in me, that's all I can do.

Q: (Inaudible)

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A: The honest answer to your question is no. I cannot guarantee that to anybody--you can't hear the question in the back. It was with all the oversight that we do in covert operations can we guarantee that it'll never leak. The answer has to be no. The question is really though, can we do covert operations with reasonable probability of success without leaks, without compromise with the people involved, so that we with honesty, with integrity, ask people to do these things and risk their lives or reputations. I don't know the answer to that to be very honest with you and I don't think I could answer that forthrightly for another year or two because we are still working out that relationship. You read in the papers the last week that the President met with the Congressional leadership. There's no question of leaks, not only in the Congress but in the Executive Branch. One of the things we suggested is that there be fewer committees in the Congress who are privy to the covert action information because it is a danger. Not because the Congress is leaking but because--according to what was labeled in the newspaper one day as Turner's Law--and that is that the possibility of a leak is geometrically proportional to the number of people who know the secrets, regardless of who they are. It's just almost a mathematical law. So we want to reduce the number of people on the Hill, but preserve enough that there is good oversight. And I'll say to you in great sincerity that there should be this oversight for covert action. Because if we made mistakes in the past, which is part of intelligence, we thought we knew what was needed, we thought we knew what was right, we were wrestling with our conscience and doing it to the best of our ability, but maybe we didn't have the proper picture and people who are open to the electorate do. So I think there should be oversight, but we hope to get it down to a smaller number but adequate for them to be totally effective.

Q: (Inaudible)

A: It's better to have no intelligence agency than one that is crippled. We cannot have an agency that is crippled, we absolutely cannot. The world is not an open society. The United States is the most open society the world has ever known. What happens in other parts of the world today, more than ever before, effects everybody in the world and us in particular in this country. And therefore, we cannot afford to have our fate determined by people who are in closed societies whose actions taken in a closed, secretive manner, are going to determine our safety, our economic well being and our political future. So we've got to have this and I don't have any doubts about our ability as a country to maintain a capable, non-crippled intelligence capabilities. If the Congress passes a law that would cripple us, the President of the United States would veto it in five minutes. And the attitude on Capitol Hill in the last 6 to 8 months has really remarkably changed. I have no concern about the Congress passing the charter for us that would cripple us. It

wouldn't get through the Congress if it would. I really have that confidence so I think as I said to the previous question, it will be a year or two before it all settles out and I can really come to you and say, I'm confident we're running without undue problems; I'm confident we're going to get there, but we're not there yet. It will take some time. It's a new process.

Q: (Inaudible)

A: Have we come any closer in our recent efforts for greater openness and so on to define the role of secret intelligence in American society? That's a marvelous question and a very appropriate one. This Sunday in Aspen, Colorado, there will be a conference at the Aspen Institute on this question of how you have secrecy in an open -emocratic society. We generated this by asking them if they would do this. We think a national debate on this issue is very much needed. Yes, I think we're making a lot of progress in that direction. Let me explain our openness policy just very briefly. I feel that no public institution in our country can survive without the support of the American public. The American public supported this agency from 1947 to about 1975 on faith. They knew we were needed and they said do what you have to do because we know you're good guys and you're doing it right. Then that was questioned in the press for a couple of years. We have made some mistakes. The public doesn't quite accept us on that same blind faith any more. If we are going to survive over the next decade or two, I think we have to have enough public support that we will be preserved as a public institution. Therefore, we have to have enough openness to generate enough understanding, to generate public support for intelligence, or a Central Intelligence Agency. But opening up does not mean opening up the doors to everything we do and how we do it, particularly not to that collection side of the house, because if you compromise how you get your information, you'll never get it again. On the evaluation side of the house we can afford to give out more to the public and it benefits the public. We released yesterday a study on civil defense in the Soviet Union, a topic that has been so distorted in the press over the last 3 or 4 years. We hope that our paper will put it in perspective. We'll take a position on one side or the other and lay out the facts of what actually is being done and what it means. That kind of thing we can be more open on and we can help with more. But those Agees, Frank Snepps, John Stockwells, those people--they're not part of an openness policy, they're part of a traitorous policy. They are disclosing things that should not be disclosed and that's not what we are talking about here. But I think we are as a nation finding our way

into a better balance of secrecy and openness in our intelligence activities. You might have noticed in this morning's paper that the citadel of intelligence secrecy in the United Kingdom where they have the Official Secrets Act (which makes it against the law to do almost anything in terms of disclosing information) yesterday proposed an amendment to the Official Secrets Act, is a new example of greater openness also.

Q: (Inaudible)

A: The relationship between the FBI and the CIA is primarily what we call counterintelligence, which is to understand and counter the efforts of other countries to collect intelligence about our country. That means in some cases, for instance, surveilling individuals. I mean if a spy comes to our country, you want to watch him because you know he is a spy, you want to see what he is doing and whom he's contacting and where is he getting information. The FBI is the only one authorized to do that in the United States to protect the rights of the American citizen because they are a law enforcement agency and they have very tight controls and so on. We don't get involved in counterintelligence activities in this country. But overseas we are in a much better position to watch that kind of thing, because the FBI is a domestic agency and we are basically a foreign intelligence agency. So we have responsibilities at CIA for counterintelligence overseas. So if the spy is in a foreign country today it is our responsibility. If he comes on an airplane to the United States tomorrow he shifts to the FBI. We've got to get real teamwork here, we've got to have real close teamwork or we'll drop the ball between us here. All these arguments-- is he really a spy, or is he really something else, or sometimes these fellows defect and they say well, one us will say he's not really a defector he's still working for them, and the other agency will say no, he really isn't--what he's giving us is good information. So we have to work very carefully together to be sure we're a team, and I'm happy to say to you that although there were times in the past some years ago when there wasn't good teamwork, I see no evidence of that today. We are working together very well, very cooperatively.

Q: (Inaudible)

A: Mort Halperin recommends we do away with human intelligence and rely only on these two technical means of intelligence collection--is that practical? No, absolutely not. I

alluded to it a minute ago. When you get information from these technical systems--and I'm oversimplifying here a bit--but generally speaking, it tells you what happened yesterday or today. It doesn't tell you why it happened or what's going to happen tomorrow, or what people are thinking and planning which may be of great importance to you. That's where the human intelligence agent has his forte. He is the one who tries to penetrate into people's thinking, into people's planning, into people's ideas, intentions, and add that dimension to this other information. I can assure you that it has got to be a trilogy of signals photographic, and human intelligence to bring it altogether. In addition, you are never happy when you have good intelligence from only one source. You lack corroboration. Even pictures can be misleading: camouflage, perception, misinterpretation of the pictures. You are best off when you get basically corroborative material from two or three different means of collecting intelligence. You are much less likely either to be deluding yourself or having to exclude. So I would fight to the end for the human intelligence agent.